In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In "Bad Reputation," Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a more general class of games in which that insight holds, and presents some examples to illustrate when the bad reputation effect does and does not play a role. The key properties are that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is "bad. We also broaden the set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the "Stackelberg type" used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely. 
Introduction
A long-run player playing against a sequence of short-lived opponents can build a reputation for playing in a specific way and so obtain the benefits of commitment power. To model these "reputation effects," the literature following Kreps and Wilson [1982] and Milgrom and Roberts [1982] has supposed that there is positive prior probability that the long-run player is a "commitment type" who always plays a specific strategy.
3 In "Bad Reputation," Ely and Valimaki [2001] (henceforth EV) construct a striking example in which introducing a particular commitment type hurts the long-run player. When the game is played only once and there are no commitment types, the unique sequential equilibrium is good for the long-run player. This remains an equilibrium when the game is repeated without commitment types, regardless of the player's discount factor. However, when a particular "bad" commitment type is introduced, the only Nash equilibria are "bad"
for a patient long-run player. 4 What is not clear from EV is when reputation is bad. This paper extends the ideas in EV to a more general class of games in an effort to find the demarcation between "bad" and "good" reputation. In addition, we try to relate the EV conclusions to past work on reputation effects.
Reputation effects are most powerful when the long-run player is very patient, and Fudenberg and Levine [1992] (FL) provided upper and lower bounds on the limiting values of the equilibrium payoff of the longrun player as that player's discount factor tends to 1. The upper bound 3 See Sorin [1999] for a recent survey of the reputation effects literature, and its relationship to the literature on merging of opinions. 4 It is obvious that incomplete information about the long-run player's type can be harmful when the long-run player is impatient, since incomplete information can be harmful in one-shot games. Fudenberg-Kreps [1987] argue that a better measure of the "power of reputation effects" is to hold fixed the prior distribution over the reputationbuilder's types, and compare the reputation-building scenario to one in which the reputation builder's opponents do not observe how the reputation builder has played against other opponents. They discuss why reputation effects might be detrimental in the somewhat different setting of a large long-run player facing many simultaneous small but long run opponents.
corresponds to the usual notion of the "Stackelberg payoff." The lower bound, called the "generalized Stackelberg payoff," weakens this notion to allow the short-run players to have incorrect beliefs about the long-run player's strategy, so long as the beliefs are not disconfirmed by the information that the short-run players get to observe. When the stage game is a one-shot simultaneous-move game, actions are observed, and payoffs are generic, these two bounds coincide, so that the limit of the Nash equilibrium payoffs as the long-run player's discount factor tends to one is the single point corresponding to the Stackelberg payoff. For extensive-move stage games, with public outcomes corresponding to terminal nodes, the bounds can differ. However, although FL provided examples in which the lower bound is attained, in those examples the upper bound was attained as well, and we are not aware of past work that determines the range of possible limiting values for a fairly general class of games.
Here we examine the upper bound more closely for a specific class of games designed to capture the insight of EV. Specifically, we define a class of "bad reputation" games, in which the long-run player can do no better than if the short-run players choose not to participate. This extends the EV example in a number of ways. We allow a broad class of stage games in which participation by the short-run players is optional; allowing for many actions, many signals, many short-run players, and a wide variety of payoffs. Especially important, we allow for a broad range of types, including types that are committed to "good" actions, as well as types that are committed to "bad" actions. Earlier research suggests that to attain the upper bound on the long-run player's payoff, it can be important to include the "Stackelberg type" that is committed to the stage-game action the long-run player would choose in a Stackelberg equilibrium. 5 We 5 EV consider two specifications for the bad type, either "committed" (to playing the bad action) or "strategic" (willing to play a different action occasionally to increase entry and the future payoff from playing "bad.") In a related model, Mailath and Samuelson [1998] argue that "bad" types -and specifically strategic bad types -are more plausible than Stackelberg types. We are sympathetic to the argument that strategic bad types may be find that the EV results fails if the probability of this Stackelberg type is too high, but extends to the case where the probability of the Stackelberg type is sufficiently low, but nonzero. This shows that it is not essential to rule out the types that support "good" reputation effects in order to derive the bad reputation result.
By extending the EV example to a broad class of stage games we are able to more clearly identify the types of assumptions key to a bad reputation. There are several such properties, notably that the short-run players can either individually or collectively choose not to participate.
However, most of the assumptions on the structure of the game seem to involve little loss of economic applicability. The key substantive assumption seems to be that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate in the game has a chance of being misconstrued as a signal of a "bad reputation."
EV motivate their example by considering an automobile mechanic who has specialized knowledge of the work that needs to be done to repair the car. We think that we have identified a broader class of bad reputation games that can be interpreted as "expert advice." This includes consulting a doctor or stockbroker, or in the macroeconomics context, can be the decision whether or not to turn to the IMF for assistance. In EV, the shortrun players observe only the advice, but not the consequences of the advice. Here we explicitly consider what happens when the short-run players observe the consequences as well. We also show that there are other distinct classes of games with rather different observation structures that are bad reputation games, such as our "teaching evaluation" game,
where "advice" is not an issue because the long-run player does not privately observe anything that is payoff-relevant for the short-run player.
Finally, we illustrate the boundaries of bad reputation by giving a number more likely than commitment types, but this does not imply that the probability of commitment types should be zero. Instead, we would argue that it is preferable for models to allow for a wide range of types, especially those with fairly simple behavior rules.
of examples and classes of participation games that are not bad reputation games.
The Model

The Dynamic Game
There are 1 N + players, a long run-player 1, and N short-run corresponds to the long-run player of type 0 θ = . The common prior distribution over long-run player types is denoted (0) µ .
There is a finite public signal space Y with signal probabilities ( | ) y a ρ . All players observe the history of the public signals. Short-run players observe only the history of the public signals, and in particular observe neither the past actions of the long-run player, nor of previous short-run players. We do not assume that the payoffs depend on the actions only through the signals, so the short-run players at date t need not know the realized payoffs of the previous generations of short-run players. A ; a strategy profile for the short-run players is a sequence of maps
We denote the set of short-run Nash responses to
Given strategy profiles σ , the prior distribution over types (0) µ and a public history t h that has positive probability under σ , we can calculate from 1 σ the conditional probability of long-run player actions
given the public history. A Nash Equilibrium consists of strategy profiles σ such that for each positive probability history 1) 
When the rational type is the only type in the model, there is an equilibrium where he chooses the action that matches the state, all shortrun players enter, and the rational type's payoff is u . However, EV show that when there is also a probability that the long-run player is a "bad type" who always plays ee , the long-run player's payoff is bounded by an amount that converges to 0 as the discount factor goes to 1. The intuition for this result has three steps. First of all, the short-run players will not enter if the long-run player is too likely to play ee . Second, from Bayes rule it follows that there is some number K such that K successive observations of E will make the posterior probability of the bad type so high that all subsequent short-run players play out. Third, when there have been 1 K − successive observations of E , the rational type of long run player is tempted to play tt instead of et, even though this lowers his short-run payoff, to avoid driving out the short-run players with another observation of E. Thus, the long-run player is tempted to take an action that is worse for both himself and the short-run players in order to avoid being incorrectly tagged as a "bad type." Our result will generalize this idea of a "temptation."
Participation Games and Bad Reputation Games
We consider "participation games" in which the short-run players may choose not to participate. The crucial aspect of non-participation by the short-run players is that it conceals the action taken by the long-run player from subsequent short-run players; this is what allows the lower bound on the long-run player's Nash equilibrium payoff in the EV example to be lower than Stackelberg payoff. We will then define "bad reputation" games as a subclass of participation games that have the additional features needed for the bad reputation result. such that
Remark: This definition says that unfriendly actions induce exit, in the strong sense that exit is the only best response if the probability of the unfriendly actions is sufficiently high. There will often be many sets of unfriendly actions. In the EV example the set { , , } ee tt te is unfriendly, and so is any subset. 
Remark: This definition says that the probabilities given to every pure action must be bounded below by a scale factor times some friendly mixture if the short-run players are not to exit. Note that weight on a friendly action is necessary for entry, but need not be sufficient for entry.
There may also be many different friendly sets. Suppose that 1 F is friendly of size 0 α ) , and let
Then if 
We say that a friendly set
.
Next we consider what signals may reveal about actions. 
) .
Notice that this is a strong condition: every action in 
, then
) . 
2) If
actions must be in some way dependent on the long-run player's action if the short-run players do not exit. This is related to the notion of an action being identified, as in Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [1994] . Here we allow the possibility that there are strategies such as et and te from the EV example that are not identified, but do not allow complete lack of identification unless the short-run players play in 1 E − with probability one. 
not enforceable, we say that the action
If an action is not enforceable then there is necessarily lack of identification, since 1 α and 1 α % induce exactly the same distribution over signals. The key point is that if the short-run players enter with positive probability, the rational type cannot play an action that is not enforceable:
by switching to 1 α % he would strictly increase his current payoff, while maintaining the same distribution over signals, and so the same future utility. Note also that a mixed action that assigns positive probability to unenforceable actions is not enforceable: if 7 It is convenient in this case to normalize the minmax payoff to 0.
We are now in a position to define a class of games we call bad reputation games.
7 When there is a single short-run player this restriction collapses to the constraint of not playing strictly dominated strategies, but when there are multiple short-run players it involves additional restrictions. It is clear that no equilibrium could give the long-run player a lower payoff than the minmax level defined in defintion 7. Conversely, in complete-information games, any long-run player payoff above this level can be supported by a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if actions are identified and the public observations have a "product structure" ). This is true in particular when actions are publicly observed as shown in Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin [1990] . In particular, the EV game is a bad reputation game. We take the friendly set to be { } et , the unfriendly set to be { } ee and the unfriendly signals to be { } E . We have already observed that { } et is a friendly set and { } ee unfriendly. The two are obviously orthogonal, and { } E is unambiguous for { } ee .
In a bad reputation game, the relevant temptations are those
. For the remainder of the paper when we examine a bad reputation game and refer to a temptation, we will always mean relative to the set Y ) .
For any bad reputation game, it is useful to define several constants describing the game. Let 1 a ) be the probability in the definition of an unfriendly set; let α be the probability in the definition of a friendly set.
Since the friendly set is finite, we may define 0 ρ > to be the least value for which a friendly enforceable action is vulnerable. . Define
Since Y ) is unambiguous for the unfriendly set, 1 r > . Also define log( )/ log r η α ρ = − which is positive, and
The Theorem
We now prove our main result: In a bad reputation game with a sufficiently patient long-run player and likely enough unfriendly types, in any Nash equilibrium, the long-run player gets approximately the exit payoff. The proof uses two Lemmas, both proven in the Appendix.
We begin by describing what it means for unfriendly types to be
be the commitment types corresponding to actions in the support of 1 F .
Definition 9:
A bad reputation game has commitment size , , ε ω φ if
This notion of commitment size places a bound on the prior probability of friendly commitment types that depends on the prior probability of the unfriendly types in Θ ) . Since φ is positive, the larger the prior probability of Θ ) , the larger the probability of the friendly commitment types is allowed to be. The hypothesis that the priors have commitment size , , ε α η )
for sufficiently small ε is a key assumption driving our main results.
Note that the assumption of a given commitment size does not place any restrictions on the relative probabilities of commitment types. In particular, let µ % be a fixed prior distribution over the commitment types, and consider priors of the form λµ % , where the remaining probability is assigned to the rational type. Then the right-hand side of the inequality defining commitment size depends only on µ % , and not on λ , while the left-hand side has the form λµ % . Hence for sufficiently small λ the assumption of commitment size , , ε α η ) is satisfied. Note that in EV the set of actions
has commitment size 0, , α η ) for all priors (0) µ since the only types are the rational type and the commitment type who plays ee .
We now have a series of Lemmas proven in the Appendix.
Lemma 1: If t h is a positive probability history in which
occurs in period t and
In other words, when the prior on committed types is sufficiently low, entry can occur only if the strategic type is playing a friendly strategy with appreciable probability. 
signal not only increases the probability of the bad type, it increases the relative probability of this type compared to any friendly commitment type. (If there were a type with a history-dependent strategy, this part of the lemma would need to be modified.) Notice that part b will be satisfied for any given ratio of type probabilities, provided that the probability of all types is sufficiently low.
0}
Lemma 3:
In a participation game if
Remark: This lemma says that if the rational type is playing a friendly strategy, his payoff is bounded by a one-period gain and the continuation payoff conditional on a bad signal. This follows from the assumption that for every entry-inducing strategy it is possible to lower the probability of all of the signals in Y ) by at least ρ while increasing the probability of each other signal by at least the multiple (1 ) ρ + % . The fact that the rational type chooses not to reduce the probability of the bad signal means that the continuation payoff after the bad signal cannot be much worse than the overall continuation payoff.
Theorem 1: In a bad reputation game of commitment size
v be the supremum of all Nash equilibrium values for the rational type.
Proof: Given an equilibrium, we begin by constructing a positive probability sequence of histories beginning with 0. Given t h already constructed, we define f must be vulnerable to temptation, so
Now apply Lemma 2 to conclude that for each
. From the definition of a friendly action, we know
Lemma 1 implies that
. Now apply Lemma 3 to conclude that for each t h
Since 
Examples
We now consider a number of examples to illustrate the scope of 
Example 4.1: EV With Stackelberg Type
We have verified Assumptions 1 and 2 in the EV example, so Theorem 1 follows. Moreover, we have relaxed the original assumptions of EV in a number of ways. One important extension is that we allow for positive probabilities of all commitment types. In particular, we allow a positive probability of a "Stackelberg type" committed to the honest strategy et , which is the optimal commitment. However, a hypothesis of the theorem is that the prior satisfy the commitment size assumption.
Here we illustrate that assumption in the context of the EV example. Suppose in particular that there are 3 types, rational, bad, and Stackelberg. The set of possible priors can be represented by the simplex in figure 2 Figure 2 When the prior falls into the region in the lower right, the probability of the bad type is too high, and the short run players refuse to enter regardless of the behavior of the standard type. Bad reputation arises because the long-run player tries to prevent the posterior from moving into this region. In EV the prior assigned probability zero to the Stackelberg type. Thus the prior and all posteriors on the equilibrium path belong to the lower boundary of the simplex. When there is a sufficiently high probability of the Stackelberg type, the short-run players will enter regardless of the behavior of the standard type; this is the region at the top of the simplex. Note that the boundaries of these regions intersect on the right edge of the simplex: this point represents the mixture between ee and et which makes the short-run player indifferent between entry and exit.
When the prior falls in the bad region, there will be no entry and the longrun player obtains the minmax payoff of zero. On the other hand, when the prior falls in the good region, we there is a Nash (and indeed sequential) equilibrium in which the long run player receives the e best commitment payoff, which is " u " in the notation of EV.
Consider the game in which the posterior probability of the bad type is zero. In this game there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the long-run player gets u . Suppose that we assume that this is the continuation payoff in the original game in any subform in which the longrun player played t at least once in the past. A sequential equilibrium of this modified game is clearly a sequential equilibrium of the original game, and by standard arguments, this modified game has a sequential equilibrium. How much does the rational long-run player get in this sequential equilibrium? One option is to play tt in the first period. Since the short-run player is entering regardless, this means that beginning in period 2 the rational type gets u . In the first period he gets ( )/2 u w − .
Hence in equilibrium he gets at least (1 )( )/ 2 u w u δ δ − − + , which converges to u as 1 δ → .
Our theorem is about the set of equilibrium payoffs for priors outside of these two regions. The theorem states that there is a curve, whose shape is represented in the figure, such that when the prior falls below this curve, the set of equilibrium payoffs for the long-run player is bounded above by a value that approaches the minmax value as the discount factor converges to 1. The diagram shows that the left boundary of the simplex is an asymptote for this curve as it approaches the complete information prior (i.e. Stackelberg type the EV conclusion fails in this game: there is an equilibrium where the rational type plays g in the first period. This reveals that he is the rational type, and there is entry in all subsequent periods, while playing anything else reveals him to be the bad type so that all subsequent short run players exit. Thus the assumption that every friendly action is vulnerable to temptation is seen to be both important and economically restrictive.
Orthogonality Issues
Suppose friendly actions send the bad signal by putting positive weight on unfriendly actions. An important class of games in which this is the case are those in which, conditional on entry, the long-run players' actions are observed. In this case the bad signals correspond to unfriendly actions, and bad signals can only have positive probability when the unfriendly action is played with positive probability. Moreover, in some games, the only friendly strategies involve randomizing in this way.
Proposition 1: If there is a friendly action that only send bad signals because of mixing onto unfriendly actions, the game is not a bad reputation game
Proof: The assumption that the friendly and unfriendly sets are orthogonal are violated. where L and R correspond to exit and M to entry. 8 In this case entry can be induced only by mixing with probability of U between ¼ and ¾.
Because friendly actions must involve mixing, they will send a bad signal, which can be taken to be either U or D. Suppose we take D to be the bad signal, and suppose that the only committed type with positive probability is D. The problem that occurs is that while repeated observations of D increase the probability of the bad type, when that probability hits the critical level, the rational player no longer needs to play a friendly action:
in effect the bad type is doing his mixing for him. Specifically, suppose that initially, the probability of the bad type is less than ¼, and that for any current probability
less than ¼ the rational type mixes so that the overall probability of D is exactly ¾. The short-run player always enters.
If U is observed, the type is revealed rational. If D is observed, the probability of the bad type increases by a factor of 4 / 3 . So when it first exceeds ¼ it is at most equal to 1/3. At this point, the rational type may reveal himself by playing U with probability 1, while preserving the incentive of the short-run player to enter. In this equilibrium, the long-run player gets 1.
We say that an action * f is sufficient for entry if, for some
with positive probability of entry. In the example above the friendly action is sufficient for entry, and sends the bad signal only because of mixing onto the 8 In this example, the short-run player has several exit actions, and his payoff depends on the long-run player's action. This is a necessary feature of two-player games where the only friendly strategies are mixed, but it is not necessary in three-player games -think of a game where player 3 has veto power, 3 only plays In if 2 plays M, and 2's payoffs to M are as in the payoff matrix of this example.
unfriendly action. That is, the sufficient action mixes between a pure action that does not send the bad signal, and an unfriendly action. If there is a friendly action that does not send the bad signal at all, then we have a quite general conclusion that the game is not a bad reputation game since such an action cannot admit a temptation. More strongly, if an action sufficient for entry does not send the bad signal at all, then a patient rational player can do almost as well as in the absence of bad reputation effects. Proof: Suppose that the prior probability of committed types is sufficiently low that the short-run players will enter when the rational type plays * f . Then it is a sequential equilibrium for the rational type to play * f in the initial period with entry by the short-run players. Subsequently, if a bad signal was observed, the short-run players stay out. If a bad signal was not observed, the probability of committed types is zero, and the continuation equilibrium is the best possible without committed types. On the equilibrium path, the rational type payoff clearly approaches that of the highest payoff without committed types, since he gets that amount beginning in period 2, and payoffs in period 1 are bounded below. 
4.4: Exit Minmax
In participation games, reputation plays a role because the short run players will guard against unfriendly types by exiting. This is "bad" for the long-run player only if exit is worse than the payoff he otherwise would receive, and the exit minmax assumption ensures that this is the case.
In participation games without exit minmax, there are outcomes that are even worse for the long-run player than obtaining a bad reputation. In this case it is possible that there exist equilibria in which the long-run player is deterred from his temptation to avoid exit by the even stronger threat of a minmaxing punishment. For example consider the game in Figure 4 , where the first matrix represents the payoffs, and the second represents the distribution of signals conditional on entry.
This game is a participation game with exit actions 1
Out and 2
Out , unfriendly action U and friendly action F vulnerable to temptation T .
There are only two types, the rational type and a bad type that plays U.
Exit minmax fails because the maximum exit payoff exceeds the minmax payoff, and we claim that there are good equilibria in this game because the threat of exiting with 2 Out is worse than the fear of obtaining a reputation for playing U which would only lead to exit with 1 Out .
To see this, consider the following strategy profile. The rational type plays F at every history unless the signal r has appeared at least once; in that case the rational type plays T . The short run player plays 2
Out if a signal of r has ever appeared. Otherwise, the short run player plays 1
Out if the posterior probability of the bad type exceeds ½ and In if this probability is less than ½. Obervations of r are interpreted as signals that the long-run player is rational.
Since 2 ( , ) T Out is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the continuation play after a signal of r is a sequential equilibrium. When r has not appeared, the long run player optimally plays F . Playing U gives no short-run gain and hastens the onset of 1 Out , and playing T shifts reallocates probability from the bad signal b to the signal r which is even worse.
9
The short-run players are playing short-run best responses. In this equilibrium, the long run player does not give in to the temptation to play T . As a result, with positive probability, the short-run players never become sufficiently pessimistic to begin exiting, and so the long run player achieves his best payoff.
In the above example there were two exit actions. The next proposition states that when there is only one exit action and the long-run player's exit payoff is independent of his own action, the worst Nash equilibrium payoff for the long run player is (not much worse than) his exit payoff. Note that this condition is satisfied in the principal-agent applications discussed in section 5. The proposition is a consequence of FL (1992). 9 Playing T gives probability ½ of shifting to the absorbing state where payoffs are -2. Playing the equilibrium action of F has probability at most ½ of switching to the state where payoffs are 0. 10 The assumption of pure action is not needed here, but we state the result this way for consistency with the rest of the paper. þ For games satisfying the conditions of the proposition, the exit minmax condition is not necessary for bad reputation. The worst equilibrium continuation value that the short-run players could inflict is arbitrarily close to the exit payoff and hence a patient long run player could not be deterred from his tempation to avoid a bad reputation.
Poor Reputation Games and Strong Temptations
Recall that an action is vulnerable to a temptation if when the short-run players participate, the temptation lowers the probability of all bad signals, and increases the probability of all others. In this case the bad reputation result requires the exit minmax condition, as demonstrated by the example in Section 4.4. Notice, however, that in the example the relative probability of g and r is changed by the temptation. If the temptation satisfies the stronger property that the relative probability of the other signals remains constant, then we can weaken the assumption of exit minmax. In this section we prove this result, and give an application to games with two actions.
First we give a formal definition of a strong temptation: 3) For all This condition lets us sharpen lemma 3 by replacing the variable 1 ( , ) y δ ρ % with the constant δ : , is the same for the equilibrium action and the strong temptation
This is a bound on the long-run player's payoff when the short-run players play exit actions that are a best response to some (possibly incorrect) conjectures. 
Theorem 3:
In a poor reputation game of commitment size / 2, , α α η )
In other words, poor reputation games have much the same consequences as bad reputation games. Notice that it is possible for a game to be both a bad reputation game and a poor reputation game, and, since strong and ordinary temptation are equivalent when
the two are necessarily equivalent in this case. The original EV game is such an example. Notice also that example 4.4 in which we construct a non-bad equilibrium has three signals rather than two. With two signals, the game would still fail the exit minmax condition and fail to be a bad reputation game, but it would never-the-less be a poor reputation game, and would not admit a good equilibrium. Finally, observe that there is an element of continuity: the proof of both Lemma 3 and 4 can be generalized, so that the extent to which the best equilibrium (in the limit as 1 δ → ) can exceed the most favorable outcome with exit is bounded by a term which is the product of the change in relative probabilities induced by a temptation and the excess of the best result given exit over the minmax.
When one of these two equals zero we get the case of either bad or poor reputation. Otherwise, the best equilibrium can exceed the best exit payoff for the long-run player, but only by a limited amount.
We turn now to the special case of two-player participation games where there is only one signal in Y ) and short-run player payoffs depend only on the signal. We focus on the case where bad reputation games have
. We show that these games are not poor reputation games (and by implication not bad reputation games either).. friendly set that maximizes the short-run player's payoff. The payoff to this action, conditional on it not generating the bad signal with the negative payoff, is positive, and since any temptation relative to Y ) must reduce the probability of the bad signal, a temptation must give the short-run player a higher payoff than this "friendliest" friendly action. For this to be true, there must be a pure strategy 1 b that gives the short-run player at least this same utility. Clearly 1 b induces entry, and since it is a pure strategy, it must be in the friendly set. This contradicts the fact that 1 f was assumed to maximize short-run player utility in the friendly set.
þ
We believe that the assumptions of this proposition imply that there is an equilibrium where the rational type's payoff is bounded below by a positive number as 1 δ → but we have not been able to show this.
Principal-Agent Entry Games
In this section we consider a class of applications which have the nature of an agency relationship. The long-run player (the agent) takes an action that affects the payoffs of both a principal (that period's short run player) and herself. When the principal's and the agent's preferences differ over the action set, and the action is not perfectly observed, we have a classical problem of incentives. A repeated interaction can often substitute for explicit contracts in alleviating this incentive problem. The long run agent's objective of establishing a good reputation can provide an incentive for efficient behavior in the short-run. In this section we classify agency environments in which the repeated interaction has the opposite effect. Bad reputation can intensify rather than mitigate the agent's incentive problem.
There is a single short-run player (the principal) whose only choice is whether to enter or to exit. If the principal enters, then the long-run player (the agent) chooses a payoff-relevant action, otherwise both players receive a reservation value which is normalized to zero. ( ) 0 u a ≥ , so that the exit minmax assumption is satisfied. (Note that this assumption will hold whenever the principal has the option to refuse to participate. Note also that from Theorem 2 this assumption is not necessary for games with two signals.)
For these games we can immediately identify the relevant friendly set. Define
which is the set of pure friendly actions. We know that F is vulnerable to a temptation.
Remark: It is also of interest to consider games in which the agent has the opportunity to take a costly action prior to the entry decision of the shortrun players. Consider for example, a game in which the long-run player is an expert advisor, and the decision of the short-run player is whether or not to pay the long-run player for advice. One example of this is the EV example of car repairs, where the long-run player is able to determine the type of repair the car needs. Other examples include stockbrokers advising clients on portfolio choices, doctors advising patients on treatments, and the IMF advising countries on economic policies. Costs incurred on exit are consistent with a bad reputation game provided that conditional on exit the temptations are less costly than the friendly actions. For example, the long-run player might be a stockbroker, and the general non-client specific information might be something about general economic conditions, acquired in advance in the form of economic reports that will be presented to the client. The friendly actions in this case are to report truthfully; the bad action might be to always claim that times are good. In this case the temptation is to announce that times are bad when they are actually good, to avoid being mistaken for the type that always announces good times. If it is costly to put together a persuasive package of economic data indicating that times are bad when in fact they are good this would not be a bad reputation game. If it is more costly to put together an honest report, then it would be a bad reputation game.
Games with Hidden Information
In these games the principal has some private information that is relevant for a decision affecting both principal and agent. Each period, nature draws a state ω ∈ Ω ; in independently from a probability distribution that we denote by p. 
Proof: Let ( ) a d denote the constant action that chooses d regardless of the signal ω , and take
to any mixed strategy that puts positive weight on every
Many examples can be found that meet the condition of the proposition.
First of all, note that the EV example is a special case. In fact the theorem extends the example to allow for public signals z about the short run players' realized payoffs (which are determined by ( , ) d ω .
2. Games with Hidden Actions
On the other hand, agency games with hidden actions, or moral hazard, tend not to be susceptible to bad reputation effects. The problem is that the second part of the definition of temptation typically fails because deviations will generally lower the probability of some good signals. However, a special case in which a hidden action game is a bad reputation game occurs when there is only one short-run player and only two signals.
The following proposition is an immediate application of the definition of a bad reputation game in this setting. 
the game is a bad reputation game.
We consider two applications of this idea. In the first, the agent chooses an action from a one-dimensional set ordered so that higher actions are more likely to give rise to the high signal. Specifically, we let In these two-signal games, as in the hidden information games, short-run player utility depends on aspects of the long-run player strategy that is unobserved by subsequent short-run players. Proposition 4 shows that this must be the case for a game with two entry signals to be a badreputation game.
Rules vs. Discretion
We can build on the analysis of hidden information games to discuss the emergence of rules over discretion in agency relationships. To motivate the idea, consider college admissions. The university (the longrun agent) receives an application. The applicant is described by a set of 
Mulilateral Entry Games
We now consider games with multiple principals. In these ( , ) u a m is linear in m, so this class of games includes those in which the agent has the opportunity to take a costly action prior to the entry decision of the short-run players. Consider for example, a game in which the long-run player is an expert advisor, and the decision of the short-run player is whether or not to pay the long-run player for advice. One example of this is the EV example of car repairs, where the long-run player is able to determine the type of repair the car needs. Other examples include stockbrokers advising clients on portfolio choices, doctors advising patients on treatments, and the IMF advising countries on economic policies. In the EV example, the private information emerges as a consequence of the decision of the short-run player to consult the long-run player, so the advice is specific to the shortrun player. In another cases, at least some part of the information is not specific to the short-run player. The advisor receives a report about the general desirability of various actions, and then meets with each of his n short-run customers, possibly learning about their individual needs. Here the advisor receives the signal regardless of whether or not he is consulted by any particular short-run player, and he may incur costs ahead of time for doing so. That is, the long-run player's payoff may depend on his action even if the short-run players decline to participate.
Costs incurred on exit are consistent with a bad reputation game provided that conditional on exit the temptations are less costly than the friendly actions. For example, the long-run player might be a stockbroker, and the general non-client specific information might be something about general economic conditions, acquired in advance in the form of economic reports that will be presented to the client. The friendly actions in this case are to report truthfully; the bad action might be to always claim that times are good. In this case the temptation is to announce that times are bad when they are actually good, to avoid being mistaken for the type that always announces good times. If it is costly to put together a persuasive package of economic data indicating that times are bad when in fact they are good this would not be a bad reputation game. If it is more costly to put together an honest report, then it would be a candidate for a bad reputation game.
We have the following obvious extension of Proposition 5. occurs in period t and
Proof: Given 1 t h − the short-run players' profile has positive probability on a profile that does not exit. At such profiles 
Proof: First observe that if
) , then the short-run players must exit in period t , so
Suppose that t h is a positive probability history in which y ) occurs in period t. Taking liberties with notation, let
denote the probability of signal y ) conditional on the unfriendly types. From
Bayes rule
Since y ) has positive probability at time t conditional on
∈ has positive probability of entry. It follows
, and that
It follows that if signals in
Hence if ) , so in all subsequent periods the signal must be an exit signal. This proves the first assertion. Continuing to use the fact that (1 ) ( , ) ( | , ) ) .
From the fact that 1 b reduces the probability of every bad signal by a positive amount (1 ) ( , ) 
) )
The final steps exactly parallel those of the proof of Lemma 3. 
